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copyright notice appears on all such copies. WE PROPOSE A PANEL data random effect 
model to quantify the impact of spatial 
distribution of land fragmentation on land cash 
rents, which is denoted by yit. Annual survey data 
of Iowa crop land cash rental rates over 
1987-2009 are employed. Cash rents are modeled 
as a function of i) regional effects αi = μLi + λZi , 
where Li denotes the lacunarity measure and Zi 
represents a vector of regional characteristics, ii) 
temporal effects of related prices Pi, and iii) a set 
of explanatory variables Xit:
(1) 
For each county, average soil quality is included 
in variable vector Z. Prices of corn, soybean, 
nitrogen fertilizer, seed and agricultural chemicals 
are included as the major input/output prices. 
Explanatory variables include other important 
crop/land demand factors such as livestock 
production, market closeness, government 
subsidies, and ethanol production. The error terms 
ɛit are assumed to be independently and normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance σɛ  2. Our 
testable hypothesis is that μ<0. 
One complication for estimation is that 
input/output prices are likely simultaneously 
determined and endogenous. To correct for 
endogeneity bias, we define a set of instrumental 
variables for the prices and specify a simultaneous 
system to apply the two-stage estimation method. 
Fitted values of the system equations substitute 
for the input/output prices in Equation (1) to 
correct for endogeneity biases. Table 1 presents 
the estimation results for Equation (1). 
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Spatial Heterogeneity Measure Empirical Model
THE LACUNARITY INDEX IS employed to 
measure spatial heterogeneity of land quality. In 
this study a land lacunarity index is built directly 
upon a soil quality measure, the land parcel’s 
corn suitability rating index (CSR). The chosen 
measure is strongly correlated but qualitatively 
different from indices based on land cover data, 
which reflect farmers’ crop choices and thus are 
endogeneously determined with cash rents. 
The commonly applied “gliding box” algorithm 
is used for calculation. Basically, a gliding box 
of a given size r (the side of a square box), is 
first placed at one corner of a landscape. Then 
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the box mass S(r), the sum of the values of the 
pixels within the box, is determined. The box is 
systematically moved through the landscape one 
pixel (cell) at a time and the box mass is 
determined for each of these overlapping boxes. 
Lacunarity for box size r is defined as 
1+var[S(r)]/(E[S(r)])2, where E[S(r)] is the mean 
and var[S(r)] the variance of the box mass 
values for box size r. A high lacunarity value 
indicates a more heterogeneous landscape with 
the cropland plots being less clustered. The 
lacunarity indices for the selected 83 counties in 
Iowa are shown in Figure 2. 
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Table 1. Estimation Results for Panel Random Effect 
Model in Equation 1
LAND IS AN IMMOBILE factor of production 
while tenant farmers, who typically own some land, 
are also generally tethered to their operation base. 
Economic efficiency has required larger and more 
expensive machines, while genetically modified 
seeds and other innovations have enabled farmers 
to operate more acres. Farmers need to spread 
operation costs over a large acreage base in order to 
survive. Since agricultural machinery is costly to 
transport, less fragmented land allows farmers to 
reduce production costs. For these reasons, 
farmland rental markets are likely to be spatially 
differentiated. 
Presumably, while land scarcity near a tenant’s 
farming operation endows the landlord with some 
bargaining power, more dispersion in row-crop 
quality land will lower cash rents. This is because 
dispersion increases both i) operating costs and so 
reduces tenant demand, ii) tenant bargaining power. 
Within this theory-of-firm framework, the objective 
of this study is to provide a rigorous empirical 
understanding of the effect of land spatial 
heterogeneity on cash rental rates. We focus on 
Iowa because that state has collected state-wide 
parcel-level measures of land quality in row-crop 
uses and also because county-level data on cropland 
rents are available since the 1980s. Cash rental rates 
for the 83 counties in 2009 are shown in Figure 1. 
The 16 counties in the state’s southeast corner are 
omitted because of data limitations.
The issue of local geography has been largely 
neglected in the agricultural land rent literature. In 
the related literature seeking to quantify the 
incidence of government subsidies on farmland 
cash rental rates, several studies find low 
pass-through, in the range of $0.13-$0.57 per acre 
for a $1 additional government payment (e.g., 
Lence and Mishra 2003). Based on county-level 
rental market concentration measures, Kirwan 
(2009) suggests that imperfectly competitive rental 
markets may play a role in incomplete cash rent 
pass-through. In this study we seek to evaluate how 
spatial fragmentation in row-crop quality land 
affects competition for such land, and so affects 
cash rental rates.
AS EXPECTED, LAND SPATIAL heterogeneity 
has a statistically significant and negative effect on 
local cash rent rates. The effect’s origin warrants 
further research. We hypothesize that two factors are 
particularly relevant: local transportation 
infrastructure, which could be represented by rural 
road density, and access to markets. The finding has 
important implications for agricultural policy. 
Commodity program payments are mailed to and 
intended for agricultural operators, rather than land 
owners. Standard economic analysis has long 
maintained that, since land is viewed as the essential 
input most inelastic in supply, most program payments 
and shifts in supply/demand functions would 
eventually pass through to landowners. However a 
large variety of pass-through studies have identified 
incomplete pass-through, where much of the effect 
rests with land operators. Why this is the case is not at 
all clear. We suggest that tenants are not nearly so 
elastic in supply as has been assumed. Our novel test 
of this theory is to instrument tenant competition by 
the spatial distribution of row-crop grade land.
References: 















1.05 1.02 1.02 1.04
1.05 1.03 1.03 1.02
1.14
1.12 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.08 1.03 1.08 1.08
1.1 1.04 1.04 1.14 1.07 1.29 1.08 1.08
1.07 1.05 1.05 1.19
1.06 1.04 1.07 1.08
1.07 1.04 1.06 1.09
1.14
1.2
1.15
1.06
1.09
1.37
1.08 1.23
1.06 1.11 1.16
1.12
1.1
1.18
1.05
1.13
1.1
1.14
1.17